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NOTES
PREEMPTION OR EXEMPTION-WHAT IS THE PROPER
TEST FOR HOME RULE ANTITRUST IMMUNITY?
COMMUNITY COMMUNICATIONS CO. v.
CITY OF BOULDER
The federal antitrust laws were ordained to foster competition and decen-
tralize economic power.' Despite this fact, state and municipal statutes often
provide for market regulation that may partially or indirectly disturb federal
antitrust policy.' Article six of the Constitution,' which mandates the
supremacy of federal law over state law, ultimately controls this displace-
ment by commanding that federal antitrust laws subjugate conflicting state
law or policy. The federal antitrust laws do not, however, always supersede
state laws infringing on competitive practices." Many state approved activities
1. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1960) (Congress passed
the Sherman Act to protect small businesses and to preserve competition among large numbers
of sellers); Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951) ("Congress was dealing with
competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly which it sought to prevent"); 21 CONG.
REc. 6314 (1890) (Senator Sherman remarked that the intent was to promote "full and free
competition"). For an exhaustive discussion of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, see
1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §§ 4.1-4.18 (1980).
2. Municipal actions in furtherance of legitimate governmental functions inevitably will
impact the marketplace. See, e.g., Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977) (zoning
ordinance alleged to be part of conspiracy to restrain competition in sale of alcoholic beverages),
vacated sub nom. City of Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), opinion reinstated 576
F.2d. 696 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park
Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977) (park district franchising policies allegedly coerced conces-
sionaires into conduct violative of antitrust laws), vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), opinion reinstated,
583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Security Fire Door Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 484 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1973) (municipal service procurement practices
eliminated competitive bidding on contracts). See also Melton, The State Action Antitrust Defense
for Local Governments: A State Authorization Approach, 12 URBAN LAW. 315, 319 n.14 (1980)
(listing 10 categories of routine municipal activities which have antitrust implications) [hereinafter
cited as Melton].
3. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2, provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
For cases irivolving federal-state conflicts, see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977)
(federal net weight labeling law held to preempt state statute); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941) (federal power to regulate immigration precludes enforcement of state alien registra-
tion act). For a general discussion of the preemption doctrine see L. TRIBE, AmERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-4 to -28, at 377-94 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TaME].
4. The principle of state action immunity from the antitrust laws appeared shortly after
the Sherman Act was passed. In Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 341-44 (1904), the Court re-
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are immune from federal antitrust sanctions under the judicially created state
action exemption doctrine.' Frequently, however, municipalities and other
state political subdivisions receive less deference under the state action ex-
emption doctrine than do states with respect to federal antitrust immunity.6
Fundamental principles of federalism dictate that a state, as a sovereign,
has the right to create political subdivisions and to allocate governmental
power to these entities as the state so chooses.' To date, thirty-five states'
jected the argument that state regulation of harbor pilots violated the antitrust laws because
operationally it gave the licensed pilots a monopoly on rendering pilotage services. The Court
reasoned:
[S]ince if the State has the power to regulate, and in so doing to appoint and com-
mission, . . . it must follow that no monopoly or combination in a legal sense
can arise from the fact that the duly authorized agents of the state are alone allowed
to perform the duties devolving upon them by law.
Id. at 345. The Olsen Court's rationale appeared to be grounded in a preemption analysis.
The remedy [to overturn an unwise state law] is in Congress, in whom the ultimate
authority on the subject is vested, and cannot be judicially afforded by denying
the power of the State to exercise its authority over a subject concerning which
it has plenary power until Congress has seen fit to act in the premises.
Id. The Court's language seems to support the conclusion that judicially implied "exemptions"
from congressional statutes would be disfavored. See also Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 911
(C.C.D.S.C. 1895) (state monopolization of purchase and sale of liquor does not violate the
Sherman Act).
5. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978)
(program requiring state approval of location of new automobile dealerships not violative of
antitrust laws); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state rule prohibiting adver-
tising by lawyers immune from antitrust challenge); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)
(state can authorize and regulate price fixing cartels). For a discussion of the antitrust im-
munity doctrine, see 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 11 207-20, at 57-133 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as AREEDA & TURNER].
6. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978)
(municipalities do not enjoy automatic immunity from the federal antitrust laws). Cf. Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (county does not possess state's eleventh amendment's protec-
tion); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (eleventh amendment does not prevent
political subdivisions from being sued in federal court). For a discussion of the scope of local
governments, see Herget, The Missing Power of Local Governments: A Divergence Between
Text and Practice in Our Early State Constitutions, 62 VA. L. REv. 999 (1976) (arguing that
because most state constitutions do not expressly allocate governmental power to local entities,
judicial doctrines evolved to legitimize local governmental actions).
7. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. Three distinct state sovereign rights may
be impinged upon when the antitrust laws are applied to local government regulation: (1) the
state's right to delegate power to local agents; (2) the state's right to enact economic and regulatory
policies; and (3) the sovereign right of the state created local governments themselves. See Melton,
supra note 2, at 340. One commentator remarked that the strength of the American political
system is in large part derived from the existence of autonomous local governments.
The first test to be applied in judging an alleged democracy is the degree of self-
governing attained by its local institutions. If . . . the province is governed by
the representative of the central government, there can be no true and complete
democracy. Only local government can accustom men to responsibility and in-
dependence, and enable them to take part in the wider life of the state.
Elazar, The New Federalism: Can the States Be Trusted? 35 Pun. INTEREST, 89, 101-02 (1974)
(quoting Ignazio Silone's School for Dictators).
8. Brief for Petitioners at 24 n.14, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
- U.S. - 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
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have enacted home rule charters, either by constitution or legislation, which
cede to local entities the state's power to administer local government, thereby
obviating the requirement of specific state authorization on matters of local
concern.9 Until recently, a question remained as to whether these grants of
home rule power conferred upon the recipient municipality the state's im-
munity from federal antitrust law.
In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, ° the United States
Supreme Court held that a constitutional grant of home rule power to a
municipality is insufficient to immunize the municipality from federal anti-
trust liability." According to the Court, the state action exemption is a limited
doctrine which attaches only when the home rule city can show that its actions
are "in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy." 2
This Note will critically analyze the Boulder Court's interpretation of the
state action exemption. Close examination of the decision reveals that a
preemption analysis, instead of an exemption analysis, would have produced
a result more protective of the state's sovereign right to delegate authority
to its municipalities. The Note will suggest an alternative approach to the
immunity problem that preserves the distinct federal and state spheres of
authority, thereby safeguarding the principles and policies behind both
federalism and antitrust legislation. As a final comment, the Note points
out that the Boulder decision may have deleterious effects on the future of
home rule government and on the recent entry of municipalities into cable
television regulation.
BACKGROUND
Antitrust "immunity" is a general term that has been applied to govern-
mental action at the federal, state, and local levels of government. 3 This
9. See Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 269, 280 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Vanlandingham]. Home rule is a generic term which
describes a variety of ways a state transfers powers of self government to its subdivisions.
The scope of home rule powers within a state is determined by its constitution, legislation,
and judicial decisions. Id. at 279-83. Arguably, the term "home rule" is rather nondescript.
This vagueness has caused one commentator to suggest that home rule may be simply any
legal mandate which strengthens the position of the city in relation to the state. Schwartz,
The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20 U.C.L A. L. REv. 671, 674
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
10. __ U.S. - , 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 841.
13. "Immunity", as used in this Note, refers to whether a governmental entity may be
liable for violating the antitrust laws. Although the existence of antitrust immunity was recognized
shortly after the passage of the Sherman Act, see supra note 4, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943), is generally considered the seminal case in the area of antitrust immunity. In Parker,
the Court held that nothing in the language or legislative history of the Sherman Act suggested
an intent to restrain state action. Id. at 350-51. The terms "state action exemption" and "anti-
trust immunity" are frequently used synonymously by the courts to refer to the Parker doc-
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immunity may be derived from either a preemption or exemption analysis.1 4
The preemption doctrine is rooted in the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution.'" In theory, preemption should be invoked only when
federal and state legislation conflicts." Exemption analysis, on the other hand,
should be invoked only to reconcile the conflicting legislation of a single
sovereign. I I
Under traditional preemption analysis,' 8 a court determines whether Con-
gress has occupied exclusively a legislative field.' 9 If the field is so occupied,
trine. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 393 n.8 (1978).
They should, however, be distinguished. See Comment, Participant Governmental Action Im-
munity from the Antitrust Laws: Fact or Fiction?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 474, 476 (1972) ("[i]m-
munity" implies that a subject has never been within the purview of a particular regulation,
while an "exemption" implies that previous regulation of a subject has been withdrawn). The
term "immunity" is preferred over the term "exemption" by this author because Congress
has never acted to exempt municipal actions from antitrust scrutiny. Moreover, the premise
underlying the Parker decision was that Congress had not intended the Sherman Act to apply
to state action. Other commentators have remarked that the Parker doctrine has been misnomered
as an exemption. See, e.g., Note, Municipal Antitrust Liability: Applying City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 563, 564 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Municipal Antitrust Liability].
14. See Hart, State Action Antitrust Immunity for Airport Operators, 12 TRANSP. L.J. 1,
19 (1980) (noting that "preemption analysis is conceptually more appropriate" than exemption
analysis because it involves federalism principles) [hereinafter cited as Hart]. See generally Handler,
Antitrust - 1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1378-83 (1978)(chastizing the Court for confusing
Parker immunity by using exemption analysis) [hereinafter cited as Handler].
15. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
16. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835, 845 (1982) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Handler, supra note 14, at 1379.
17. Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835, 846 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Handler, supra note 14, at 1378.
18. Preemption occurs when a state statute obstructs the "accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)
(citation omitted). Either a congressional intention to "occupy the field" or a conflict between
federal and state statutes is required to overturn an incompatible state statute. See Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963). See generally Note, Pre-
emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959)
(outlines preemption analysis and analyzes the Court's reliance on congressional intent).
19. A finding of congressional occupation of a particular field requires a showing that it
is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress that an area be regulated by a comprehensive
federal scheme. Preemption by occupation may occur where an activity is inherently appropriate
for federal control and inherently inappropriate for state control. Actual congressional legisla-
tion concerning that activity is not a prerequisite to a finding of occupation. See, e.g., Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (federal power to regulate immigration precludes enforce-
ment of state alien registration act). It may also occur where preemption is expressly mandated
by federal statute. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (Federal
Warehouse Act supersedes state laws regulating those phases of business which are regulated
under the federal act). Finally, preemption by occupation may occur where federal coverage
of an area by statute and regulation is so pervasive that no reason is left for state control.
See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (federal statute mandating uniform
standards for design and construction of tankers leaves no room for states to impose different
or stricter design requirements).
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state and local laws are preempted even in the absence of an incompatible
or direct conflict with federal legislation.2" If, however, the federal govern-
ment has not occupied the entire field, state and local laws can be overruled
only when they are so incompatible with federal law that the two enact-
ments are not able to coexist. 2 ' The courts, however, are usually reluctant
to infer congressional occupation of a field, 2 and instead permit state and
local laws to coexist with federal legislation despite having inconsistent means
or ends. 3
Applying a classic preemption analysis,2" the Supreme Court first prom-
ulgated the state action immunity doctrine in Parker v. Brown." In Parker,
20. See supra note 19. In this context, preemption precludes state or local legislation of
a specific area. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (state cannot
prohibit noncitizens from exercising federally granted right to fish in its waters on same terms
as state residents); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (federal food weight label-
ing requirements preempt state requirements); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,
411 U.S. 624 (1973) (federal airport noise regulations preempt state and local control).
21. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
22. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (congressional policy
favoring vigorous competition does not preempt state from requiring oil producers to extend
all "voluntary allowances" uniformly to all stations they supply); Ohio Bureau of Employmcnt
Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977) (state unemployment compensation statute not preemp-
ted by federal act); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (regulation of employment of illegal
aliens not preempted by federal powers over immigration); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470 (1974) (state trade secret laws not preempted by federal patent laws); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (federal state exchange
rule permitting forfeiture clauses in employment contracts does not preempt state rule invalidating
such clauses); New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) (eligibili-
ty standards under federally supported work incentive program do not preempt state work rules);
Goldstein v. California 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (state record piracy laws do not conflict with federal
copyright statutes so as to violate the supremacy clause); Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (state act imposing strict liability for oil spill damage
not an unconstitutional intrusion into federal maritime domain). Commentators have recog-
nized that the Burger Court has been especialiy reluctant to employ federalism principles to
hold state laws preempted. See, e.g., B. MEZINES, J. STEIN, & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§§ 2.02-.03, at 2-16 to -67 (1982); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on
Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 639-53 (1975).
23. Under fundamental principles of federalism, state policies that can coexist with federal
constitutional and statutory schemes should not be superseded. See, e.g., Employees v. Dept.
of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973) (Court will not infer congressional intent
to deprive states of eleventh amendment immunity unless Congress indicates clear intent); United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (federal criminal statute narrowly construed because
Congress "will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance" unless
it clearly conveys its purpose to do so); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947) ("historic police powers of the States" are not to be superseded by a federal act "unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress").
24. Commentators have recognized that Parker was decided squarely under a preemption
analysis. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 3, §6-24, at 380-82. Professors von Kalinowski and Handler
have noted that the Burger Court has not returned to this canon of construction in subsequent
cases which purportedly follow Parker. See 7 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION, § 46.03[1], at 46-22 to -23 (1981) [hereinafter cited as VON KALINOWSKII; Handler,
supra note 14, at 1380.
25. 317 U.S. 341 (1942).
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a California law which established a raisin cartel was challenged under the
Sherman Act. The declared purpose of the cartel was to "conserve the
agricultural wealth of the state" and to "prevent economic waste." 26 The
legislation employed to effectuate the cartel was a marketing scheme which
eliminated competition, fixed prices, and restricted output in the state raisin
industry. Finding nothing in the language or the history of the Sherman
Act which indicated congressional intent to exclusively occupy the legislative
field or to proscribe state action, the Court upheld the state law creating
the cartel.27 The Court recognized that a state, as a separate sovereignty,
possesses the right concurrently to regulate commerce and to restrain com-
petition absent express congressional intent to the contrary.2" The Parker
Court noted that, conversely, a state can never, under the supremacy clause,
remove conduct from the purview of the federal antitrust laws if Congress
intended to prohibit such conduct. Specifically, a state cannot simply grant
immunity to parties violating the Sherman Act either by authorizing the con-
duct or by declaring that the action is lawful.2 9
Subsequent to Parker, the Supreme Court did not reconsider the state
action doctrine for more than thirty years.3" Beginning in 1975, however,
the Burger Court handed down a series of decisions that restricted the
scope of antitrust immunity under Parker." The Court's latest decisions in-
terpreting Parker, however, are replete with language indicative of an ex-
26. 317 U.S. at 346.
27. Id. at 350-51.
28. Id. at 351.
29. Id.
30. For a complete list of the cases decided by the lower courts during this period, see
VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 24, § 46.03, at 46-20 n.4.
31. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court declared that action
merely authorized by the state was outside the state action exemption. The state, acting in
its sovereign capacity, must compel a state agency to engage in anticompetitive activities in
order for the Parker exemption to apply. Id. at 791. The Court elaborated upon the require-
ment of mandatory state directives in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
According to the Bates Court, Anticompetitive activities are exempt from federal antitrust laws
only when they are subject to active state supervision and part of a clearly expressed state
policy. Id. at 362. Likewise, in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), the Court
held that if the state's directives are permissive, rather than compulsory, the state's policy is
deemed neutral and no immunity attaches to the conduct. Furthermore, even if an exemption
is instrumental to the successful functioning of the state's regulatory policy, no immunity is
conferred upon it. Id. at 597. This same standard has been held to apply to municipalities.
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), the Court found
that because municipalities are merely agents of the state which do not have independent
sovereignty, they must demonstrate a state legislative intent to displace competition through
the alleged anticompetitive activity to qualify for immunity. See also California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (to satisfy two step test
for antitrust immunity state policy must be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed"
and be "actively supervised" by the state itself); New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin
W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978) (state regulatory scheme "clearly articulated and affir-
matively expressed . . .[and] therefore outside the reach of antitrust laws under 'state action'
exemption").
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emption analysis. Unlike Parker, they are not predicated on federalism prin-
ciples under the supremacy clause. As a result, these decisions talismanically32
have replaced Parker's preemption rationale with ambiguous references to
a "state action exemption" from antitrust liability.33
Properly applied, exemption analysis addresses conflicts within a single
sovereign. A court's role under this analysis is to ascertain whether the
legislature intended to carve out an exception to a given statute's general
rule.34 Exemptions can be created either expressly by statute33 or impliedly
by judicial decision.36 If the exemption is express, the role of the judiciary
is purely a matter of statutory interpretation, and the court must determine
whether the exemptive language relieves certain parties from the obligation
of compliance with the statute in question.37 In situations where there is
no express exemption, courts may examine the disparate objectives of the
conflicting enactments and determine whether an implied exemption would
be proper.
When applying an exemption analysis in the antitrust context to conflicts
between two federal statutes, (federal-federal conflicts), the Court routinely
32. In Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972) the court reversed a grant of antitrust immunity for government action calling
the lower court's reasoning "much too talismanic."
33. See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 24, § 46.03[1], at 46-23. Commentators have remarked
that the "state action exemption" is not a true exemption created by the legislature, rather
it is a judicial doctrine developed to reconcile antithetical federal and state regulations. See,
e.g., Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws,
49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Posner]; Slater, Antitrust and Government
Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71 (1974); Thomas,
City of Lafayette's State Action Test Reformulated: A Meaningful Standard of Antitrust Im-
munity for Cities, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 345 [hereinafter cited as Thomas].
By analyzing the immunity question as one of exemption, the Court has circumvented the
constitutional question of whether Congress could eliminate state sovereign immunity from the
antitrust laws if it so desired. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Congress has
the power to limit state sovereign immunity).
34. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835, 846 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Handler, supra note 14, at 1378-79. The Court has applied an
exemption analysis in a number of cases involving conflicting federal laws. See, e.g., National
Broiler Marketing Ass'n. v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 822-29 (1978) (conflict between Sher-
man Act and Capper-Volstead Act); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
350-55 (1963) (conflict between Clayton Act and Bank Merger Act); Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357-61 (1963) (conflict between Sherman Act and Securities Exchange Act).
35. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1976) (exempting agricultural cooperatives from antitrust
laws); 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976) (antitrust laws not applicable to labor, horticultural, and agricultural
associations); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (S.E.C., C.A.B., I.C.C., F.P.C., and F.C.C. approved
transactions exempt from antitrust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976) (export trade associations have
immunity from antitrust violations).
36. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (baseball exempt from antitrust laws);
Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (lobby-
ing by persons to influence passage of laws beneficial to themselves or detrimental to com-
petitors not within scope of antitrust laws).
37. See, e.g., National Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978) (Court
found that statutory exemption for farmers could not be relied upon by poultry suppliers).
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presumes that promoting and protecting competition are dominant national
policies which should not be easily displaced. 8 Because of this assumption,
the Court often attempts to subordinate the goals of the law which authorizes
or contemplates anticompetitive conduct.3 9 These reconciliatory efforts by
the Court would be deemed impermissible if applied to a federal-state con-
flict under a preemption analysis. Preemption analysis affords maximum state
autonomy by guaranteeing state sovereignty "save only as Congress may con-
stitutionally subtract from their authority." ' The Burger Court's decisions
applying exemption analysis to federal-state conflicts, however, evidence this
pro-competitive preference. This preference, which comes from an assump-
tion of "competitive" superiority, results in frequent averments that "im-
plied exemptions from the antitrust laws are not favored.""' The Court has
used a variety of standards to determine whether a state sanctioned activity
performed by a private party is a "state action" for immunity purposes.
For example, findings of actual state supervision of the regulatory policy
or a declared state intention to replace free market competition with market
regulation likely resulted in a determination that a particular activity con-
stituted state action for the purposes of antitrust immunity."2 The Court
38. According to the Court, antitrust policy should be a major concern in the decision-
making processes of federal regulatory agencies. See, e.g., Gulf States Util. Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 411 U.S. 747 (1973) (F.P.C. must consider anticompetitive consequences of
security issue); Federal Maritime Comm'n. v. Aktiebolaged Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S.
238 (1968) (passenger steamship conference restraints interfering with antitrust law policies will
not be approved if contrary to "public interest"); Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. United States,
387 U.S. 485 (1967) (I.C.C. required to consider anticompetitive consequences before approving
stock issuances). The Court has also held, however, that encouragement of competition should
not be the sole consideration of a regulatory agency when it is determining whether to permit
certain anticompetitive activity. See, e.g., United States v. I.C.C. (Northern Lines Merger Cases),
396 U.S. 491 (1970) (benefits to public of railway merger outweigh loss of competition); F.C.C.
v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 93 (1973) ("encouragement of competition . . .
has not been considered the single or controlling reliance for safeguarding the public interest").
39. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (authority of
F.P.C. to order interconnection does not immunize power company from antitrust regulation);
United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968) (bank merger not allowed under Bank
Merger Act where convenience and needs of community could be met in ways short of merger);
Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966) (Shipping Act not in-
tended to exempt shipping industry rate making activities from all antitrust regulation). But
see Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (transaction challeng-
ed as violative of antitrust laws under C.A.B. control and therefore immune from antitrust
prosecution); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1973) (trans-
action under C.A.B. control immune from antitrust laws).
40. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51.
41. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978) (there
is a presumption against implied exclusions from the antitrust laws); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (975) (stating "there is a heavy presumption against implicit exemp-
tions"); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 351 ("an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's con-
trol over its officers is not lightly to be attributed to Congress").
42. 317 U.S. at 352. For a discussion of the state action determination, see AREEDA &
TURNER, supra note 5, 214, at 80-92; Melton, supra note 2, at 329-36.
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presently uses a standard identical to that employed in federal-federal
conflicts" s reasoning that Congress could not have intended state agencies
to have more power than federal agencies to exempt private conduct from
federal antitrust laws."" The Court further developed the standard for deter-
mining when the state action exemption applies. In City of Lafayette v. Loui-
siana Power & Light Co.," the Court considered whether the state action
exemption applied to municipal activities. This action arose when two cities
filed an antitrust suit against private utility companies. The defendants argued
that the cities themselves had violated the antitrust laws, citing various ac-
tions by the cities that clearly would violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act
if engaged in by private parties. 6 The cities responded that Congress never
intended to subject local government to the antitrust laws, and that the "state
action" doctrine rendered the antitrust laws inapplicable to them."
43. This practice began in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). In Cantor,
a retail druggist sued a state regulated utility charging that the utility's policy of dispensing
free light bulbs to consumers restrained trade in the sale of light bulbs. The Court refused
to imply an exemption from the antitrust laws "without first determining that the exemption
was necessary in order to make the [state] regulatory act work, and 'even then only to the
minimum extent necessary.' " Id. at 597. This standard was borrowed from cases which had
confronted conflicts between the Sherman Act and another federal statute. Id. at 596 (quoting
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 389 (1973) and Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)). In further support of this statement, the Court cited another
case which involved a federal-federal statutory conflict. In United States v. National Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975) the Court held that an implied antitrust
immunity is not favored and can only be justified if there is a clear repugnancy between an-
titrust laws and the regulations.
44. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1979) (when implying
exemptions, state and federal regulations should be scrutinized under the same standards). This
approach has been criticized for manifesting a disregard for the federalism principles expressed
in Parker. Justices Rehnquist and Stewart have expressed reservations over the Court's prac-
tice. Justice Stewart stated:
The Court's analysis rests on a mistaken premise. The "implied immunity" doc-
trine employed by this Court to reconcile the federal antitrust laws and federal
regulatory statutes cannot, rationally, be put to the use for which the Court would
employ it. That doctrine, a species of the basic rule that repeals by implication
are disfavored, comes into play only when two arguably inconsistent federal statues
are involved. "Implied repeal" of federal antitrust laws by inconsistent state regulatory
statutes is not only "not favored", it is impossible.
Id. at 628-29 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis and citations omitted). See also AREEDA &
TURNER, supra note 5, 1 214a, at 83 n.ll; Handler, supra note 14, at 1378 (both treatises
noting that it is inappropriate to apply standards developed to reconcile federal-federal con-
flicts to federal-state problems).
45. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
46. The utilities alleged that the cities conspired to (1) "engage in sham litigation" to pre-
vent the financing of nuclear power plant construction, (2) eliminate competition "by use
of covenants in their . . . debentures," (3) exclude competition in various markets by entering
into "long-term supply agreements," and (4) displace the utilities by requiring customers to
purchase electricity from the cities as a "condition of continued water and gas service." Id.
at 392 n.6.
47. Id. at 394.
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A sharply divided Court held that municipalities are not immune from
the antitrust laws merely because of their status as political subdivisions of
the state."8 The majority opinion concluded that a congressional intent to
immunize municipalities from the Sherman Act could not be inferred in light
of the presumption against implied exclusions from antitrust laws."9 Con-
gress "sought to establish a regime of competition as the fundamental prin-
ciple governing commerce in this country,"" ° and in the Court's view, the
municipalities did not demonstrate the existence of a compelling policy to
overcome this fundamental principle." Further, notions of federalism
emanating from the supremacy clause as discussed in Parker2 were not a
bar to antitrust enforcement."
Although the Lafayette majority agreed that under certain circumstances
city action could be immune from the antitrust laws,54 only a plurality agreed
on the proper test to determine when immunity existed. The plurality
exempted from antitrust laws only those anticompetitive acts engaged in by
state and local governments that are "pursuant to state policy to displace
competition with regulation or monoply public service.""5 The plurality
Justices stressed, however, that a "specific, detailed legislative authorization"
is not always necessary before a city can assert an immunity defense to an
antitrust suit. 6 Although the Justices did not elaborate on this proposition,
the plurality suggested this standard could be met by showing that the state
had contemplated the possible anticompetitve effects of the regulatory activity
when it delegated to its subdivision the regulatory powers in question. 7
48. Id. at 408.
49. Id. at 397-408. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. He was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens.
50. Id. at 398.
51. Id. at 400-08. The Court noted that economic decisions made by a municipally owned
utility would probably not be in the community interest or in the interest of the national economy.
Moreover, due to the sheer number of local governments, "a serious chink in the armor of
antitrust protection" would result if local governments were able to make economic decisions
with impunity from the antitrust laws. Id. at 408.
52. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
53. Id. at 400.
54. Id. at 405 n.31.
55. Id. at 413. The plurality consisted of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens.
Chief Justice Burger joined in this result.
56. Id. at 415.
57. Id. (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 53 F.2d 431, 434 (5th
Cir. 1976)). In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that although he agreed with
the plurality that state action immunity was not applicable automatically to municipalities, he
advocated subjecting local governments involved in proprietary activities to the test promulgated
in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). According to the Chief Justice, the
state must compel the anticompetitive activity and the implied exemption from antitrust laws
must be necessary for the regulatory act to work, "and even then only to the minimum extent
necessary." 435 U.S. at 425-26, 425 n.6 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Cantor, 428 U.S.
at 579).
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Four Justices in Lafayette dissented5" from the view that municipalities
are not within the scope of the Parker immunity." The dissenters asserted
that the plurality's holding threatened to severely restrict the states' sovereign
right to function autonomously within the federal system because it impaired
the states' ability to delegate authority to their political subdivisions.60 Accord-
ing to the dissent, the plurality ignored the principles of federalism enun-
ciated in National League of Cities v. Usery.6' In Usery, the Supreme Court
held that Congress could not "directly displace the States' freedom to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. '"62
Underpinning the Usery decision was the recognition that the states are in-
dispensable elements of a dual system of government,63 and therefore, state
sovereignty can suppress an otherwise valid congressional exercise of power.6"
58. Justice Stewart authored the dissent in which Justices White and Rehnquist joined and
Justice Blackmun joined in part. Justice Blackmun wrote a dissent expressing the concern that
because the imposition of treble damages is mandatory under § 4 of the Clayton Act,
municipalities would also be subject to treble damages. 435 U.S. at 441-43 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). See Municipal Antitrust Liability, supra note 13, at 580-82; Note, Federal Antitrust Im-
munity: Exposure of Municipalities to Treble Damages Sets Limits for New Federalism: City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., II CONN. L. REV. 126 (1978); Note, Antitrust-
Whither Municipal Antitrust Liability after Lafayette?, 15 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 89 (1979)
(authorities arguing that treble damage liability would place an onerous burden on municipal
governments). But see Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to Municipal Activities, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 518, 544-49 (1979) (municipal treble damages liability might not be within
the intent of Sherman Act) [hereinafter cited as Application].
59. 435 U.S. at 430-32 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that states and
municipalities have been equated in other contexts, for example, in construing the double jeopardy
clause, the fourteenth amendment, and the contract clause. Id. at 430 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 434-35, 438 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
61. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In Usery, the constitutionality of federal legislation which extend-
ed coverage of federal minimum wage and maximum hour standards to virtually all state govern-
ment employees was challenged.
62. Id. at 852.
63. The Usery Court recognized that the state "is not merely a factor in the 'shifting economic
arrangements' of the private sector of the economy . . . but is itself a coordinate element
in the system established by the Framers for governing our Federal Union." Id. at 849. For
a discussion of Usery, see Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of
"Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling
National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Govern-
ment Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977).
64. In his concurring opinion in Lafayette, Chief Justice Burger also cited Usery, but for
a different proposition than the dissent. The Chief Justice relied on Usery for the proposition
that a city's operation of a business enterprise was not an integral state function. 435 U.S.
at 424 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
353 (1974) (business of supplying electric service not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the state). Justice Stewart, however, characterized Chief Justice Burger's proprietary and govern-
mental distinction as a "quagmire" and "virtually impossible to determine." 435 U.S. at 433
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
Significantly, the Chief Justice remarked about the marked similarity of language employed
in Parker and Usery. Both of these decisions recognized that state governments possess "at-
tributes of sovereignty" which cannot be vitiated because the Constitution establishes affir-
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Two years after the Lafayette decision, a unanimous Court in California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,61 promulgated a two-
part test for antitrust immunity based on the Lafayette plurality's standard.
First, the anticompetitive measure must be "one clearly articulated and af-
firmatively expressed as state policy." ' 66 Second, the statutory scheme must
be "actively supervised" by the state itself. 67 Although the Court set forth
this precise test, the Usery and Lafayette decisions indicate that a majority
of the Court continues to recognize that principles of federalism may re-
quire some deference to a state's delegation of authority to municipal
governments.
61
State home rule enactments evidence a policy decision to vest state
sovereignty at the local level.6" Whether federalism principles will safeguard
this delegation from federal encroachment was unresolved. This issue ultimate-
ly was addressed in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder.7"
The question before the Court was whether a state legislative grant of home
rule powers to a municipality rendered it immune from liability under the
federal antitrust laws, or whether additional state authorization is required
before municipal action is viewed as equivalent to state action for purposes
of antitrust immunity.'
FACTS
The Colorado Constitution confers upon the city of Boulder the status
of a home rule city." In 1964, Boulder granted a nonexclusive permit to
mative limits on congressional power. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 423. Compare Usery, 426 U.S.
at 845 ("We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to
every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may
lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitu-
tion prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner"), with Parker, 317 U.S. at 351
("In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign,
save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed pur-
pose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress").
65. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
66. Id. at 105 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410).
67. Id. The challenged state statute in Midcal called for retail price maintenance in the
wine industry. The Court held that the scheme failed to satisfy the "actively supervised" prong
of the test because the state did not monitor market conditions, review the reasonableness of
the prices set by private parties, or regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. Id. at 105.
68. The four dissenting Justices in Lafayette, along with Chief Justice Burger in his concur-
ring opinion recognized some federalism concerns in subjecting municipalities to antitrust liability.
435 U.S. 389, 422-23, 430 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The same Justices
formed the majority in Usery. See 426 U.S. at 834.
69. Levi, Gehring & Groethe, Application of Municipal Ordinances To Special Purpose
Districts and Regulated Industries: A Home Rule Approach, 12 URB. L. ANN. 77, 118 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Levi, Gehring & Groethe].
70. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
71. Id. at 836.
72. The Colorado Constitution states that any town or city with a population over 2,000
is a home rule jurisdiction. COLO. CoNsT. art. XX, § 6.
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Community Communications Co. (CCC), to build and operate a cable televi-
sion system to serve the entire city. Due to the advent of satellite technology
and the potential for expanded programming, the CCC announced plans to
expand its existing system in 1979.'" Shortly thereafter, Boulder Communica-
tions Co. (BCC), another cable firm, expressed an interest in obtaining a
permit to provide competing cable television services. 74 After receiving BCC's
request, the city imposed a three-month emergency moratorium on cable
television expansion. This action prohibited CCC from geographically extend-
ing its system beyond the area already served." The city insisted that the
moratorium was necessary because CCC's continued expansion during the
drafting of the ordinance would act as an entry barrier discouraging
competitors. 6 During this period, the city drafted a model ordinance which
provided for comprehensive regulation of the cable television industry.7
CCC filed suit seeking injunctive relief against the city and BCC, com-
plaining that they were engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation
of the antitrust law . 8 CCC informed the city that it considered the ordinance
invalid and that it would proceed with the expansion. The city, attempting
to avoid a total cessation of competition in the cable market, filed an action
for injunctive relief in state court, but the action was denied.'" Failing to
succeed at the judicial level, the city resorted to self-help and began to destroy
CCC's cable.8
73. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D. Colo.
1980). Until 1979, CCC's entire operation in Boulder consisted of re-transmitting television
signals to part of the city that had poor TV reception due to the geography of the area. CCC
enjoyed a de facto monopoly in this market despite the city's efforts to induce competition.
See Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 2, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). In 1979 CCC expressed its desire to construct an earth station for satellite
reception of remote channels. 485 F. Supp. at 1037.
74. 485 F. Supp. at 1037. Prompted by these developments, Boulder hired a consultant to study the
cable television market. The consultant advised the city that it should be concerned about the
tendency of a cable system to become a natural monopoly. Id.
75. 102 S. Ct. at 837-38.
76. Id. at 887 n.7. The city claimed that other cable operators responding to its solicitation
of permits indicated that they would not enter the market if CCC proceeded to wire the entire
city. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 5 n.8, Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
77. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 710 (10th Cir. 1980)
(Markey, J., dissenting).
78. CCC alleged that Boulder's ordinance would violate § 1 of the Sherman Act which
provides that "[e]very contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States ... is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C § 1 (1976). The district
court noted that although CCC had gathered some circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy
between BCC and Boulder, the evidence was insufficient to establish a likelihood that CCC
would prevail on the merits of this claim. Boulder, 485 F. Supp. at 1038.
79. City of Boulder v. Community Communications Co., No. 80 CV 0198-1 (Boulder Dist.
Ct. Feb. 6, 1980).
80. The city acted pursuant to BOULDER COLO., CODE 31-10 (rev. ed. 1965), which authorizes
the removal of encroachments on public rights of way. Within a month, 6,350 feet of CCC's
cable had been destroyed. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
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At the injunction hearing, the city claimed that it was immune from the
federal antitrust laws and that the ordinance was a valid exercise of its police
powers. The district court, relying on Lafayette, ruled that the city was not
immune.8' The court of appeals reversed.8" The appellate court distingished
Lafayette and held that as a result of Boulder's home rule status, the city's
action was equal to action by the state of Colorado for antitrust immunity
purposes. 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari" to decide the question
of whether a state's grant of extensive powers of self-government in local
matters to a home rule municipality confers state action antitrust immunity
on the recipient municipality.
DECISION
In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,8 5 the United States
Supreme Court denied antitrust immunity to the city of Boulder. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, 6 held that the Parker exemption applies
only to state actions when the state is acting in a sovereign capacity or to
municipal actions that are in furtherance of a clearly articulated and affir-
matively expressed state policy."
The Court rejected Boulder's argument that home rule powers vest a right
81. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1039 (D. Colo.
1980).
82. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1980).
83. Id. at 708.
84. 450 U.S. 1039 (1981).
85. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
86. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens joined in Justice Brennan's opinion.
Justice Stevens wrote a concurrence stressing the fact that the majority's opinion was not tan-
tamount to a holding that the antitrust laws had been violated. Justice Stevens remarked that
the Cantor Court's rejection of Parker immunity did not suggest that the state utility regulatory
commission in Cantor had become a party to a Sherman Act violation by authorizing the pro-
gram under attack. Id. at 844-45. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissent,
in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor joined. Justice Rehnquist criticized the
Court for misconstruing the Parker doctrine as a matter of exemption rather than preemption.
Id. at 845-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that by adopting the "clear
articulation and affirmative expression" test to determine whether municipal actions qualify
for state action immunity, the majority relegated the political subdivisions of states to a posi-
tion indistinguishable from private entitities for purposes of antitrust analysis. Id. at 845. Justice
Rehnquist outlined three specific problems raised by the majority decisions: (1) whether per
se rules would apply to municipalities; (2) whether municipalities will be subject to treble damage
provisions of the Sherman Act; (3) whether National Soc'y of Professional Engr's v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), holding that a decision to replace competition with regulation
is not within the competence of private entities, would apply to municipalities. Id. at 848.
Justice Rehnquist warned that if Professional Engineers could be applied, municipalities would
be unable to defend a challenged ordinance with claims that benefits to the community outweigh
anticompetitive effects. Id. On the other hand, if Professional Engineers is deemed inapplicable
and municipalities are permitted to defend regulations on the basis that benefits to the com-
munity outweigh anticompetitive effects, Rehnquist concluded that the courts would be called
upon to review social legislation for reasonableness of local regulations. Id. at 849.
87. 102 S. Ct. at 841.
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in local government, similar to the states', to conduct its business with im-
punity from antitrust laws." Rather, state action immunity under Parker,
the Court held, was inherently limited to states, and a state's sovereignty
cannot be transferred in toto to its subdivisions. 9
The majority further relied on the Lafayette decision which held that a
state acting in its sovereign capacity may sanction anticompetitive municipal
activities, thereby immunizing the locality from Sherman Act liability. Accord-
ingly, the Boulder Court held that municipalities could partake of the "state
action exemption" only to the extent that they acted pursuant to a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy in restraint of trade."
The Court was unwilling to infer that by simply granting home rule powers
to its cities, Colorado intended to immunize Boulder from anticompetitive
sanctions. The Court held that the state's broad"grant of plenary powers
of self-government was, at best, a neutral accommodation of municipal
action." Thus, the mere grant of home rule power to Boulder did not satisfy
the "state action exemption" requirement that the city's challenged action
embody a clearly expressed policy of the state. 92
ANALYSIS
Despite the fact that the conflict in Boulder was between federal antitrust
laws and a municipal ordinance enacted pursuant to state authority, the Court
88. Id. at 841-42. The Court remarked that this argument "both misstates the letter of
the law and misunderstands its spirit." Id. at 842.
89. Id. The Court held that Parker recognized a dual system of government in which there
is no place for sovereign cities under federalism principles. Id. The Court's interpretation of
Parker ignores preemption principles under the supremacy clause. See supra notes 28-29 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, such a reading is not justified because the Court's discussion
of legislative directives was not made in reference to specific grants of plenary authority to
state subdivisions.
90. Id. at 843. Because the Court found that the ordinance did not meet the "clear articulation
and affirmative expression" standard, it did not have to pass on the question of whether the
ordinance would survive the "active state supervision" test formulated in California Retail Li-
quor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). 102 S. Ct. at 841 n.14.
91. 102 S. Ct. at 843. The Court stated:
A state that allows its municipalities to do as they please can hardly be said to
have 'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive actions for which municipal liabil-
ity is sought. Nor can those actions be truly described as 'comprehended within
the powers granted,' since the term, 'granted,' necessarily implies an affirmative
addressing of the subject by the state.
Id. This statement effectively overrules the dictum in Lafayette. See supra notes 56-57 and
accompanying text.
92. The Court dismissed this argument as simply an attack on the wisdom of the long-
standing congressional commitment to antitrust regulation. 102 S. Ct. at 843. The Court held
that the decision did not interfere with a state's ability to "allocate governmental power be-
tween itself and its political subdivisions." Id. at 844 (citing Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 416). Quoting
Lafayette, according to the majority in Boulder, Lafayette meant "only that when the State
itself has not directed or authorized an anticompetitive practice, the State's subdivisions in
exercising their delegated power must obey the antitrust laws." 102 S. Ct. at 843-44.
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used a "state action exemption" analysis rather than a preemption analysis
to assess the legality of the ordinance."' Perfunctorily applying this exemp-
tion analysis,9 ' the Court dismissed the city's argument that the moratorium
ordinance was an act of government performed by the city acting as the
state in local matters, thus satisfying the "state action exemption" criteria. 5
Under the Boulder Court's analysis, Parker was interpreted as creating an
implied exemption from the antitrust laws. Because Parker was indisputably
decided under a preemption analysis, such a broad interpretation is unwar-
ranted. The Court's mischaracterization of the issue as exemption was con-
traindicated by Parker, which provides that "a state does not give immunity
to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it,
or by declaring that their action is lawful. . . ."9 The supremacy clause
prohibits a state from creating an exception to a federal law if Congress
intended regulation of the contemplated activity. Therefore, under a strict
interpretation of Parker, the question the Court should have faced in Boulder
was whether the city ordinance, enacted pursuant to its home rule autonomy
under the Colorado Constitution, was preempted by the Sherman Act under
the supremacy clause. 97
A preemption analysis, rather than an exemption analysis, is inherently
more appropriate whenever the Court is called upon to examine the coaction
between enactments of a federal and a state sovereign. Under a preemption
analysis, the supremacy clause prohibits only those state actions which stand
as obstacles to the accomplishment of congressional objectives. Accordingly,
states are assured a maximum amount of legislative freedom so long as state
action does not interfere with federal goals.98 The dissenting Justices in
Boulder noted another compelling reason for using a preemption analysis.
Because exemption analysis standards developed to resolve federal-federal
conflict problems interject no complicated federalism issues, they may be
patently insufficient when applied in the very different context of federal-
93. See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
94. 102 S. Ct. at 839-43. The Court simply stated: "Our precedents thus reveal that Boulder's
moratorium ordinance cannot be exempt from antitrust scrutiny unless it constitutes the action
of the State of Colorado itself in its sovereign capacity. Id. at 841.
95. Id. at 841-42.
96. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51. The Boulder Court interpreted Lafayette as holding "that
the state as sovereign might sanction anticompetitive municipal activities and thereby immunize
municipalities from antitrust liability." 102 S. Ct. at 840. This statement is irreconcilable with
Parker. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
97. Justice Rehnquist characterized the issue in this manner. 102 S. Ct. at 845 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). The Court's expeditious reading of Parker as creating exemptions from the
antitrust laws was neither unprecedented nor unexpected. The Burger Court had decided six
prior federal-state conflict cases in the immunity area under exemption analysis prior to Boulder.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. See also Hart, supra note 14, at 21 ("[a]
preemption analysis presumes that state action will not be preempted by the Sherman Act,
while an exemption analysis, as stated in Cantor and Lafayette, presumes that exemption is
granted only when necessary, and then only to the extent necessary").
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state conflicts." Significantly, the exemption analysis used in Boulder failed
to reach the constitutional question of whether requiring clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state authorization of municipal anticompetitive
activities impermissibly impinges upon a state's ability to delegate authority
to its subdivisions.
In National League of Cities v. Usery,'" the Court recognized that there
are attributes of state sovereignty that may not be impaired by Congress
without violating federalism principles resting at the core of a democratic
government.' 0 ' The Usery Court posited two such sovereign state functions:
"administering the public law and furnishing public services."' 0 2 In addi-
tion, the right to delegate governing authority to political subdivisions through
home rule enactments has been held a sovereign state right." 3 The prevalence
of home rule, which decentralizes state government, has flourished because
increased local autonomy serves the state's interests in both administering
public law and furnishing public services.'" A state which grants home rule
99. 102 S. Ct. at 845-46. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In discussing the conflicting doctrines,
Justice Rehnquist noted that the preemption doctrine implicates basic notions of federalism
because it involves utilization of supremacy clause principles, and that the presumptions im-
plied in exemption analysis are different from those applied in the preemption context. Justice
Rehnquist concluded that "questions involving the . . . 'state action' doctrine are more prop-
erly framed as being ones of preemption rather than exemption." Id. at 846. See supra note 44.
100. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
101. Id. at 845. The doctrine of federalism, as applied to the antitrust law/state action
controversy, is grounded in two specifically enumerated constitutional provisions which limit
federal power. As interpreted by the Court, the tenth amendment authorizes states to regulate
local markets and attend to local economic problems "save only as Congress may constitu-
tionally subtract from their authority . . . ." Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351. See also
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (tenth amendment was enacted "to allay
fears . . . that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers"). Addi-
tionally, the eleventh amendment prohibits suits brought in federal court against a nonconsent-
ing state. See, e.g., Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 910 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895) (action against
state for monopolization of the sale of liquor dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
Furthermore, the Court has recognized that the Constitution, and thus the federal govern-
ment in general, is premised on the existence of states as independent entities. See Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (national government will operate best if state autonomy
is properly respected); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) ("[t]he Constitution,
in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States").
102. 426 U.S. at 851.
103. A state's power includes creating and structuring its government, which necessarily in-
cludes allocating power as it chooses. See Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League,
415 U.S. 605, 615 n.13 (1974) (the Constitution does not limit the state's plans for distribution
of power); Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) (state's allocation
of power to regulate dairy market to state commission beyond federal control); Dreyer v. Il-
linois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902) (state regulation of public officials insulated from due process
claim). The only limitations on the powers of a state are those affirmatively listed in the Con-
stitution. One example of a constitutional limit on the exercise of this power is the "one man-
one vote" rule for apportioning state legislatures, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964),
and for electing state officers. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
104. In Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), the Court.recognized the importance
of local government control stating: "institutions of local government have always been a ma-
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powers to its cities allows legislatures to devote more time to matters of
state-wide importance, thus avoiding burdensome local matters raised by
municipal officials who are dependent upon the legislature for authorization
of each new ordinance. Broad delegations of home rule autonomy also per-
mit decision-making by those most familiar with, and responsive to, local
needs and conditions.'
0 5
The flaw in the Boulder decision lies in its narrow interpretation of
federalism principles. The majority held that in order to protect a state's
control over its municipalities, a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy to displace the federal antitrust laws must be demonstrated.' 0
Federalism principles need not be invoked to protect a state's ability to super-
vise its subdivisions, however, because this ability exists ipso facto in the
state's relationship to its municipality. Rather, federalism is intended to pro-
tect a state's right to make autonomous decisions regarding internal
operations.1°
In a federalist system, state governments must be accorded unfettered con-
trol to provide for the political structure or prescribe the powers of its
municipalities.' Inquiries into abuses in the administration of the powers
conferred by the state on its municipalities are not a proper function of
the federal courts.' 9 Comity and federalism concerns integral to Parker and
Usery cannot be reconciled with federal courts probing motives of states
jor aspect of our system, and their responsible and responsive operation is today of ever in-
creasing importance to the quality of life of more and more of our citizens." Id. at 481.
105. See infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
106. 102 S. Ct. at 242-43.
107. See generally Federalism 86 YALE L.J. 1018 (1977) (examining the premises and doc-
trinal implications of federalism).
108. Apparently, state legislative power over municipalities is not restricted by the Constitu-
tion. See Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933) (municipal corporation cannot
invoke privileges or immunities against its state); City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S.
192 (1923) (municipality cannot assert equal protection claim against its state). Some states
have profferred the proposition that a state has absolute control over its cities and may create
or abolish them, realign their boundaries, grant or deny them power, or force them to carry
out state policies. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 73, 267 P.2d 717
(1954) (alteration of boundaries); Nahlen v. Woods, 255 Ark. 974, 504 S.W.2d 749 (1974) (en-
forcement of state fee collection); City of Long Beach Resort v. Collings, 261 So. 2d 498 (Fla.
1972) (merger of cities and unincorporated areas); Willows v City of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 337,
461 P.2d 190, (1969) (exercise of granted power of annexation); Landwer v. Village of North
Barrington, 94 Ill. App. 2d 265, 237 N.E.2d 350 (5th Dist. 1968) (general grant and denial
of powers), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1082 (1969); City of Glasgow v. Duncan, 437 S.W.2d 199
(Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (extension of state right to appeal conferred to municipal employee); Schar-
ping v. Johnson, 32 Wis. 2d 383, 145 N.W.2d 691 (1966) (denial of incorporation petition).
109. One commentator remarked:
[T]he judiciary is not competent to determine the proper allocation of political
power-to build a framework for government .... In an era of expanding municipal
responsibility, the need for rational answers to questions about the proper limits
on municipal power and proper restrictions on exercise of that power must be
answered by a body whose special competence is politics rather than law.
Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1616 (1965).
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in granting home rule power. Furthermore, there are few, if any, manageable
judicial standards by which a court can ascertain the state's intent in grant-
ing home rule power or in regulating competition." '
The Boulder Court's placement of the burden on the states to articulate
an intention to displace the antitrust laws ignores the fact that states may
consciously choose not to articulate policies in order to facilitate decision-
making and experimentation at the local level."I' This result, however, vir-
tually was inevitable under an exemption analysis. By imposing the clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed standard on state action, the Court
has ensured that the strong national policy favoring competition will not
be abrogated by the states. Although this approach is consistent with the
canon of construction the Court invokes in federal-federal conflict
problems-that exemptions to antitrust laws are not to be easily inferred- ' 2
its application to federal-state conflicts severely restricts the states' liberty
to enact legislation which may supplement or indirectly contravene the federal
antitrust laws. Judicial activism, as endorsed in Boulder, is particularly
egregious because it encroaches upon both congressional and state powers
conferred under the Constitution. A preemption analysis is the preferred
approach to resolve federal-state conflicts in which a legitimate exercise of
congressional power encroaches upon the constitutional right of state
sovereignty.
If a preemption analysis had been used in Boulder, the Court could have
placed the burden on Congress to either manifest an intention to occupy
the entire legislative field,'' 3 or to create a legislative exclusion for certain
anticompetitive activities or for home rule in general."" A preemption analysis
110. In Lafayette, Justice Stewart cautioned against detailed scrutiny into the reasonableness
of state regulations by federal courts sitting as "superlegislatures". 435 U.S. at 437-39 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Similarly, he argued in Cantor that the Court was creating a "statutory simulacrum
of the substantive due process doctrine." 428 U.S. at 640 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See general-
ly J. BURNS, ANTITRUST DILEMMA: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD MODERNIZE THE ANTITRUST LAWS 59-66
(1969) (arguing against judicial determination of antitrust policies).
11. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) ("It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country").
112. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
113. The Parker Court assumed, without actually deciding the issue, that Congress had not
occupied exclusively the antitrust field. Furthermore, the Parker Court noted that prohibiting
a state from violating the antitrust laws because of its effect on interstate commerce was within
the scope of the congressional commerce power. 317 U.S. at 350.
114. Undoubtedly, Congress could choose to create an exclusion from the antitrust laws for
home rule municipalities. The Court has noted in earlier cases, however, that in passing the
Sherman Act, Congress exercised all the power it possessed under the commerce clause. See
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) ("Congress in passing
the Sherman Act, left no area of its constitutional power unoccupied"). Cf. United States v.
Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1945) (all commercial enterprises are within
the scope of congressional regulatory power). For this reason, the Burger Court's creation of
implied exemptions to the antitrust laws can be criticized as being contrary to precedent and
congressional intent.
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also would have reinforced the political safeguards of state sovereignty and
avoided altering the relationship between the states and their political
subdivisions.
Parker and Usery can be applied concertedly to the specific facts in Boulder
to support the utilization of preemption analysis. Usery recognized a state's
right under the Constitution to exist as a separate governmental entity.' '
This right was found necessarily to include the ability of a state to structure
internal governmental affairs." 6 A state's decision to grant home rule power
is an exercise of this right which must be accorded comity under Usery.
A grant of home rule power exemplifies a policy decision by the people of
the state to vest municipalities with sovereign powers to best provide for
the welfare of the state as a whole. ' 7 Thus, when a state has granted home
rule power, it is erroneous to classify the interests of the state government
as intrinsically more important than those of its municipality."' Incontrover-
tibly, the legislature in a home rule state retains authority to effectuate state
policy by subordinating municipal interests to more compelling state
interests. ' '9 The Court, however, should not presume such subordination
115. 426 U.S. at 844. The Usery Court relied on Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
71 (1868), for the proposition that there are constitutional provisions that incontrovertibly
recognized the necessary existence and independent authority of states. See Davidson & But-
ters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitutional Limits on the Federal Interdiction of An-
ticompetitive State Action, 31 VAND. L. REv. 575, 597-604 (1978) (arguing that the results
in Parker and Usery were based upon status of state as sovereign political entities).
116. See supra note 103. See also Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71
(1978) (emphasizing, "the extraordinarily wide latitude that States have in creating various types
of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon them"); Lockport v. Citizens for Com-
munity Action, 430 U.S. 259, 269 (1977) (recognizing the wide discretion states have in form-
ing and allocating governmental tasks to local subdivisions); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387
U.S. 105, 108 (1967) (establishing procedures for selecting local school board officials is within
the state's broad latitude in selection of such officials).
117. The grant of home rule power is radically different from the historical concept of a
municipal corporation as embodied in Dillon's Rule:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted
in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects and purposes of the corporations,-not simply convenient, but indispen-
sable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power
is resolved by the courts against the corporation and the power is denied.
I J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911)
(emphasis in original). Traditionally, the courts have been suspicious of municipal actions and
have scrutinized them strictly. See Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 1596 (1965) (municipal governments can be expected to act in their own self interests
against the public good).
118. The grant of home rule authority delegates to the city the power to act as the state
and to establish state policy at the local level. Furthermore, two home rule models evidence
the presumption that home rule cities have all the powers of the state that are not denied.
See Vanlandingham, supra note 9, at 307-08.
119. See, e.g., Del Luca v. Town Adm'r of Methuen, 368 Mass. 1, 11-12, 329 N.E.2d 748,
755 (1974) (municipal ordinances on subject of planning boards precluded by state planning
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under the auspices of judicial review.120
As a matter of state constitutional law, Colorado's home rule amendment
fuses the municipal government with that of the state.'21 For this reason,
municipal actions pursuant to legitimate grants of home rule power should
be presumed equal to state action under a Usery analysis."' This presump-
tion, however, could be rebutted because acts that are either ultra vires or
preempted by state legislation would not be presumed state action for the
purposes of this test.' 2 3 In Boulder, the presumption should stand because
no ultra vires acts on the part of the city were alleged and no evidence was
presented that Boulder acted beyond its chartered powers.
Once municipal action is equated with state action, the next question to
resolve is whether the city's ordinance is preempted by state legislation. In
this regard, there was no evidence showing that Boulder had violated any
state law, or that Colorado has any law or policy explicitly relating to cable
television.'" Under a preemption analysis, however, municipal action can
board statute); City of Canton v. Whitman, 44 Ohio St. 2d 62, 65, 337 N.E.2d 766, 769 (1975)
(police, sanitary, and other similar regulations enacted by municipality under powers of local
self-government must yield to state police regulations); Nugent v. City of East Providence,
103 R.I. 518, 524, 238 A.2d 758, 762 (1968) (state legislature may enact statutes superseding
a home rule municipality's ordinance if the statute concerns a matter of state-wide importance,
not a purely local concern). See generally Note, Antitrust Laws & Municipal Corporations:
Are Municipalities Exempt From ShermanAct Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEO.
L.J. 1547, 1560 (1977) (courts generally resolve statutory disputes between states and municipalities
in favor of state regulatory power).
120. See Levi, Gehring & Groethe, supra note 69, at 118-19.
121. The Colorado Constitution confers to a city the "full right of self-government in both
local and municipal matters." CoLo. CONST. art. XX, § 6, cl. 13. See Comment, Antitrust State
Action Defense Expanded to Include Home Rule Municipalities-Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 1026, 1035 (1980) (Colorado's home rule charter
evidences a delegation of state police power to provide for citizens' needs).
122. This presumption may enable home rule cities to demonstrate state policy or intent
sufficient to satisfy the dearly articulated and affirmatively expressed standard adopted in Boulder.
See Thomas, supra note 33, at 378. But see Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp.
1025, 1028-33 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (municipal acts should not automatically be equated with state
acts for purposes of immunity).
123. Municipal acts beyond the authority of its home rule powers are ultra vires and, conse-
quently, are invalid whether or not they conflict with a state statute. See, e.g., City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 394-97 (1977) (conduct having disproportionate
impact on nonresidents ultra vires); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway, 557 F.2d 580, 590-91 (7th
Cir. 1977) (state grant to park district of power to contract and lease does not authorize the
park district to force private competitors to violate antitrust laws), vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978),
opinion reinstated, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979). Further-
more, because municipalities always remain subservient to the dictates of the state legislature,
the state has ultimate authority to preempt municipal statutes. See supra note 119 and accom-
panying text.
124. To date, the subject of cable television has yet to be addressed by either the Colorado
Constitution or any state statute. Furthermore, the regulation of cable television is not among
the eight enumerated powers in Colorado's home rule amendment. The Colorado Public Utilities
Commission also has declined to exercise jursidiction over cable television. See Amicus Curiae
Brief for the State of Colorado at 14, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
102 S. Ct. at 815 (1982). See also In re Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 73 PUB. UTr. REP.
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be preempted if it violates a policy underlying state law. Colorado does have
a state antitrust statute which establishes a general policy of competition
throughout the state.'2 5 This general policy, standing alone, is not sufficient
to preempt the municipal action. Rather, the burden would be placed on
Boulder to overcome the presumption of state legislative intent to subject
cities to antitrust liability. If Boulder could show evidence of municipal
exclusion from the state antitrust statute, the municipal action ordinance
would be presumed tantamount to state action for purposes of immunity.
The presumption that municipal action is equivalent to state action for
purposes of antitrust immunity determination is required by the comity prin-
ciples underlying Usery.' 26 This presumption also is the starting point for
traditional preemption analysis under Parker. The Parker Court recognized
that Congress had not intended to preempt state law by occupying the entire
field of antitrust legislation.'27 When exclusivity of federal regulation is neither
express nor implied, the Court examines the nature of the state law. If enacted
by a municipality in its sovereign capacity to further a legitimate state in-
terest, the law may stand to the extent federal antitrust policy will not be
defeated. 2 '
The legitimate state interest advanced in Boulder was to preserve competi-
tion in the market place.' 29 The validity of the municipal ordinance must
be evaluated to determine whether the ordinance presents an obstacle to the
state's articulated interest. The Boulder dissenters reasoned that the two-step
Midcal standard, used by the Boulder majority in its "state action exemp-
tion" analysis, could be applied to test the validity of municipal ordinances
under a preemption analysis. 3 ' The crucial difference between the majority's
use of the Midcal standard and the use suggested by the dissent is that the
dissenters would apply the standard directly to the enacted municipal or-
dinance, not to the state legislation conferring power upon the home rule
municipality. According to the facts in Boulder, time was sought to draft
a model ordinance and to solicit and evaluate applications from interested
competitors.' 3 ' The ordinance satisfies the first prong of the Midcal test in
that it reflects a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed intention to
restrain trade for a relatively short duration in furtherance of a legitimate
3d 161, 172-74 (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1968) (commission held that it was without jurisdic-
tion to regulate any aspect of cable television service).
125. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-4-101 to -102 (1973 & Supp. 1981). Despite the fact that Col-
orado's home rule amendment does not specifically subject home rule municipalities to federal
and state antitrust laws, it does provide that all applicable Colorado statutes will continue to
apply to home rule cities and towns. COLO. CoNsr. art. XX, § 6. This provision likely is a
truism in light of the supremacy clause and the state's omnipotent control over its subdivisions.
See supra note 108.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
127. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
129. 102 S. Ct. at 838.
130. Id. at 850 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
131. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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goal. Likewise, the second prong of the test is met because the municipality
retained active supervision of the ordinance. Having satisfied the two-part
Midcal test, antitrust immunity should have been extended to Boulder.
This analytical framework will not result in the unfettered extension of
antitrust immunity to municipal action. The same considerations that cur-
tail grants of home rule power to municipalities limit the scope of municipal
immunity as well. First, anticompetitive activities will be subject to scrutiny
under state law to determine if the acts were ultra vires, or contrary to existing
state antitrust laws or policy.' Second, under a preemption analysis, a
legitimate regulatory interest always must be demonstrated.' 33
The foregoing analysis suggests an analytical framework for the lower
courts and city attorneys to apply when determining whether particular anti-
competitive conduct falls within the realm of Parker immunity.'34 Under this
analysis, the state retains the right to control home rule, which is inextricably
intertwined with the ability to the state to structure its integral governmen-
tal functions, while Congress retains the right to control immunity under
the Sherman Act.
IMPACT
Viability of Home Rule Cities After Boulder
One of the most severe implications of the Boulder decision is that it under-
mines the very advantages that home rule systems were intended to precipitate.
Most home rule charters follow the "legislative supremacy" model that gives
the municipality freedom to legislate in any area in which the state has not
acted. 33 The major advantage of this model is that it alleviates the problem
of narrow judicial interpretation by allocating to municipalities plenary
authority over matters of local concern. Under this scheme, municipalities
are given latitude to supplement state efforts so long as compliance with
state law or the effectuation of its purpose is not significantly impeded by
the local law.' 36
132. See Thomas, supra note 33, at 379-80.
133. It bears emphasizing that under this analysis, neither the city by ordinance, nor the
state by statute could establish "state policy" that would immunize its commercial activities
from antitrust liability. To do so would clearly be beyond the scope of Parker. See supra notes
28-29 and accompanying text.
134. Preemption analysis has been praised for providing predictability in the law, thereby
improving the process of judicial decisionmaking. See Comment, Parker v. Brown: A Preemp-
tion Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164, 1176 (1975).
135. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 676; Vanlandingham, supra note 9, at 293-96. The "legislative
supremacy" model was adopted by the American Municipal Association, which introduced a
model home rule constitutional provision in 1953. In this model, the authority of municipalities
to act without specific legislative authorization is emphasized. AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIA-
TION [National League of Cities], MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HOME
RULE (1953). For a general discussion of this model, see Levi, Gehring & Groethe, supra note
69, at 116.
136. Levi, Gehring & Groethe, supra note 69, at 116-17; Vanlandingham, Constitutional
Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA (NLC) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7 (1975).
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Statutory or non-home rule cities, on the other hand, derive their author-
ity directly from state statutes. These authorizing state statutes, which are
often narrowly construed, transfer to non-home rule cities the power to act
in a particular area."' Because a non-home rule city can always turn to the
granting legislation and its history for evidence of a "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed" state policy, non-home rule cities generally will be
able to meet the standard, thus, insuring themselves immunity under Boulder.
For home rule cities whose only statutory authorization is the grant of home
rule power, securing antitrust immunity under Boulder's "clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed" standard will present a formidable problem.' 38
Home rule municipalities, now leary of enacting legislation which may
adversely affect competition without the imprimatur of clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policies, will be forced to petition state
legislatures to articulate policies and goals with the efficacy of producing
antitrust immunity.'" Many state legislatures may have neither the
willingness,'" nor the resources or knowledge to comply with such requests.' 4'
Arguably, many home rule powers are granted with the intention of
eliminating the need for state approval of municipal action. Therefore, re-
quiring state approval of specific local legislation would frustrate the states'
original purpose for granting home rule power.
Not only does Boulder frustrate the policies behind home rule, but the
decision also promotes highly centralized forms of state government which
may radically alter the relationship between the states and their
municipalities." 2 Communities may find themselves subject to antitrust 1ia-
137. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (absent safeguarding state
constitutional provisions, municipalities have no powers of government beyond those specifically
conferred by the state legislature). See also Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79
(1907) (statutory cities are agents of states). See generally 1 E. MCQULLIN, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS § 2.08(a) (3d ed. 1971) ("a municipal corporation is not itself sovereign").
138. Returning to the state legislature for statements or letters of intent appears to be the
only way home rule cities will be able to meet the Boulder prerequisites absent specific statutory
enactments. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
139. Application, supra note 58, at 532 ("forcing municipalities to obtain state approval
for any plan that might have anticompetitive effects would cause needless delay, overload the
state legislatures, and frustrate decentralized decision making"). Professor Areeda notes that
requiring conscious legislative displacement of the antitrust laws might produce a paradoxical
result in that under a home rule system, the opportunity would not arise for the state legislature
to enact the particular legislation from which the court might infer delegated power to displace
the antitrust laws. Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 435, 449 (1981).
140. Inhibiting the state's ability to delegate authority to its municipalities may cause states
to abandon certain courses of action altogether. State governments may decide it is not worth
the time and effort to detail directives to secure antitrust immunity for its agents. Melton,
supra note 2, at 345.
141. The pressing needs of municipalities may not coincide with the state legislature's docket
of business. See Melton, supra note 2, at 357 n.143 ("[flrequent trips back to the legislature
regarding new programs would be difficult enough, but rewriting a whole set of well-established
laws on the basis of an implied construction of the antitrust laws is an unreasonable expectation").
142. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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bility for actions taken when the Parker doctrine was thought to confer
immunity.'"3 Actions by home rule municipalities, if found non-exempt and
violative of the antitrust laws, will subject municipalities to the Sherman
Act's treble damage liability.' Even if municipalities are successful in argu-
ing a "governmental immunity" to treble damage liability,'" the locally
regulated businesses and those contracting with the city would still be liable
for treble damages. To the extent that state and local governments attempt
to avoid this liability, states will tend to limit broad delegations of power.
Indeed, the dissenting Justices in Boulder noted that the only recourse may
be for home rule municipalities to cede their authority back to the state,
thereby destroying the popularity of home rule in the United States." 6
Boulder's Impact on Cable Television Regulation
Although the cable television industry is one of the fastest growing in the
United States today,"' its regulation is still in a trial and error stage.'"
Overlapping regulations at the federal, state, and local levels have burdened
cable operators and prevented local communities from realizing the benefits
143. But see Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 437 n.22 (1978) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (it is inequitable to base the availability of Parker defenses on statutes passed
before immunity criteria were determined). Moreover, commentators have cautioned against
applying the "state action exemption" standards retroactively. See, e.g., Handler, supra note
14, at 1388 n.160 (any "clear statement" requirement should be applied only prospectively);
Posner, supra note 33, at 725 (state regulatory agencies should be given the opportunity to
explain relevant policy bases for prior decisions before they are subjected to antitrust liability).
See generally Taurman, Reflections on City of Lafayette: Applying the Antitrust "State Action"
Exemption to Local Governments, 13 URB. LAW. 159, 180-82 (1981) (local governments might
have to breach anticompetitive contracts which were entered into when Parker was thought
to provide immunity because such contracts usually are subject to continuing reevaluation).
. 144. The imposition of treble damages is mandatory under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1976). The issue of treble damages turns on which party should bear the burden of an-
ticompetitive activities: the taxpayers by paying higher taxes because of an antitrust judgment
against the municipality, or the public as consumers by paying higher prices as a result of
private monopolistic conduct sanctioned by a municipality. See Comment, Erosion of State
Action Immunity from the Antitrust Laws: City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 165, 173-74 (1978).
145. In City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), the Court refused
to award punitive damages in a § 1983 suit against a municipality. It could be argued that
based on Facts Concerts, the Court would also refrain from imposing treble damages on municipal
antitrust violations.
146. 102 S. Ct. at 851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
147. Cable television presently serves more than 15 million homes in the United States.
Estimates predict that by the end of the 1980's approximately one-half of the homes in North
America will subscribe to cable television. See J. MARTIN, TELEMATiC SocmErY: A CHALLENGE
FOR TommoRRow (1981).
148. See ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE, REPORT OF THE SLOAN COMMISSION
ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 152 (1971) ("in the first two decades of cable growth, the federal
government has been rudderless, the municipalities inept, and the states inactive") [hereinafter
cited as SLOAN REPORT]. See also Barnett, State, Federal, and Local Regulation of Cable Televi-
sion, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 685, 691-98 (1972) (criticizing the franchise system for compromis-
ing public interest) [hereinafter cited as Barnett].
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of cable television.' 4 9 Diagnosing this problem, the FCC recently eliminated
most of the federal regulations applicable to the cable industry, 5 thereby
encouraging state and local governments to regulate television. In turn, states
rely exclusively on local government to perform all non-federal cable
regulatory functions.'3 '
Typically, municipal governments regulate cable television by enacting fran-
chise ordinances, or by granting permits or licenses to cable operators. The
legal justification for this municipal regulation derives from either an im-
plied or an explicit power of the municipality over the use of its streets and
public rights of way.' 2 Cable television differs from traditional over-the-air
television broadcasting because it uses a direct cable link instead of radio
waves to deliver programming to its subscribers.' 3 The necessity of using
the city's thoroughfares to physically string cable into subscribers' houses
is conducive to local regulation of market entry and rate determination.' 4
After Boulder, however, municipalities desiring to enter into exclusive fran-
chising arrangements or to own their own cable systems must seek specific
state authorization or risk antitrust liability.
149. See SLOAN REPORT, supra note 148, at 151-54. See also Stern, The Evolution of Cable
Television Regulation: A Proposal for the Future, 21 URB. L. ANN. 179, 181 (1981) (in order
to remedy situation, author advocates federal regulation with maximum autonomy in franchis-
ing process reserved to local governments) [hereinafter cited as Stern].
150. In re Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C. 2d 663 (1980)
(to be codified in 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151-161, .305, .5, .57-65, .7).
151. In the absence of federal and state directives, cities have responded to the acute need
for cable regulation. Early local regulatory efforts were unsuccessful primarily because municipal
officials were uninformed and failed to envision the vast community services that cable televi-
sion could provide. Furthermore, municipal officials often responded to the pressure of cable
operators by adopting hastily written franchising ordinances with only vague specifications as
to the design of the system. Most of the franchises granted did not require up-to-date technology
or expansion of services, but instead only provided for maintenance of a minimum number
of cable channels. See Snychef, Municipal Ownership of Cable Television Systems, 12 U.S.F.L.
REv. 205, 207-11 (1978).
152. See 12 E. MCQULLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 34.14 to .15, at 45-56 (3d ed. 1970).
A local government has the authority to make franchise rights conditional. See Barnett, supra
note 148, at 685 n.3 (1972); LaPierre, Cable Television and the Promise of Programming Diver-
sity, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 25, 68-69 (1973); Mahoney, Cable Television's Jurisdictional Dispute,
24 CATH. U.L. REV. 872, 883 (1975). See generally Davis, Cable Television Franchising-The
Role of Local Governments, 51 FLA. B. J. 78, 79 (1977) (municipal consent is prerequisite
to cable operator seeking to use public ways for carrying out business in the nature of a public
utility).
153. Operationally, the coaxial cable, which resembles telephone lines and carries signals from
their point of origin to subscriber's television sets, is the basis of cable television. See SLOAN
REPORT, supra note 148, at 12-14. Within this decade, optical fiber cable will begin to replace
the coaxial cable technology. Fiber optic systems will dramatically increase the cable's capacity
to carry hundreds of television channels. See Miller & Beals, Regulating Cable Television, 57
WASH. L. REV. 85, 86-88 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Miller & Beals].
154. Studies performed on cable systems recommend that states should allow major cities
to set maximum rates and terms of performance, create adjudicatory mechanisms and appeals
procedures to resolve disputes, and establish franchise boundaries within the city. See SLOAN
REPORT, supra note 148, at 161-62. Accord Barnett, supra note 148.
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Because several characteristics of the cable television industry make it a
natural monopoly, the possibility of municipal antitrust liability when
regulating that industry is indeed real." ' Cable television is highly capital
intensive, and therefore, geographically large franchise areas may be required
for economies of scale. 1 6 Absent guarantees against overt competition and
an adequate return on investment, franchisees may be reluctant to make the
initial wiring expenditures in a given locality. Cable operators usually must
wait several years before they can realize a profit. If during this time their
financial stability could be placed in jeopardy by an overcrowded market,
there will be an adverse effect on the development and growth of the
municipality's cable system. Furthermore, economists recognize that in most
natural monopoly situations, consumers will receive the best service from
one or a few operators.'"
Perhaps the most promising public benefit of cable television is its capa-
city to enable community-based programs to be aired on television. ' If local
governments prudently regulate their franchises, cable television's large chan-
nel capacity can be used to provide a multitude of community oriented
services.' 59 As part of the franchise agreement, a municipality can require
operators to devote a given number of channels for community-interest pro-
155. For a discussion of the monopolistic characteristics of cable, see 2 A. KAHN, THE
EcoNoMIcs oF REUIAno N: PRINCIPLES AND INsTITUno Ns 2 (1971); Stern, supra note 149, at 184.
156. Three characteristics of cable make it a natural monopoly; (1) the high capital expen-
diture necessary for the construction of a cable system; (2) the relatively narrow profit margin;
(3) the length of time before a return on the investment is realized. Miller & Beals, supra
note 153, at 95. For example, the total estimated cost of establishing a cable system in St.
Louis County, Missouri was 34.7 million dollars. See Stern, supra note 149, at 184 n.24. Fur-
thermore, it has been estimated that it may take 10 years before an investor in a cable opera-
tion realizes a profit. See Stern, supra note 149, at 184 n.27.
157. See Stern, supra note 149, at 184.
158. The F.C.C., recognizing the potential of cable, stated:
Cable can make a significant contribution toward improving the nation's communica-
tions system-providing additional diversity of programming, serving as a communica-
tions outlet for many who previously have had little or no chance of ownership
or of access to the television broadcast system, and creating the potential for a
host of new communications services.
FCC, Report to Congress, CA TV Regulation, reprinted in 22 P&F RADIO REG. 2d 1755, 1760
(1971).
159. In addition to broadcast and entertainment programming, state-of-the-art cable televi-
sion systems presently offer the following services: television channels for public and govern-
ment use; cable operator originated programming of local interest (origination cablecasting);
channels for educational use; closed circuit channels which connect local public institutions;
specialty information channels devoted solely to financial, consumer price, or weather informa-
tion; "all news" channels; FM radio channels; children's and cultural programs, foreign language,
video music, or other channels devoted to special audiences. Additional public services that
cable television is expected to provide include: security monitoring (burglar, fire, and police
alarms); computer terminals; medical monitoring; meter reading; energy management; transac-
tional services (e.g. home shopping and banking); polling; new highway traffic management;
accessing selected libraries of films or video tapes; and electronic mail delivery. Miller & Beals,
supra note 153, at 87-88 nn.9 & 13.
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grams and events, and to obtain the most technologically advanced cable
television services.6' Most cable television planners recognize that if the in-
dustry is to be fully responsive to municipal needs, the regulating authority
must be in a position to view and appraise those needs.' 6 ' Such a regulatory
role would best be served by local government.
CONCLUSION
In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, the Supreme Court
denied antitrust immunity to the city of Boulder, a home rule municipality,
when the city imposed a ninety day moratorium on cable television expan-
sion for the purpose of drafting a statute to regulate cable franchises. The
Court held that under the state action exemption doctrine, only when a
municipality acts in furtherance of a "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" state policy can it be shielded from antitrust liability. The Court
concluded that Colorado's grant of extensive home rule powers to Boulder
was insufficient to meet this standard and, therefore, did not confer anti-
trust immunity on the recipient municipality's ordinance.
The outcome in the Boulder decision was not unexpected in light of the
fact that the Burger Court has decided other federal-state conflicts in the
antitrust immunity area using the "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" exemption test. Boulder, however, raised federalism issues which
were not present in any of the Court's prior decisions and which rendered
the state action exemption test inappropriate. By applying this test, the Court
significantly impaired two essential elements of federalism. First, the state's
ability to exercise its legislative powers in a manner not specifically prohibited
by Congress was restricted. Second, the decision encroached upon the state's
right as a sovereign to exist independently in a dual system of government.
These infringements of state's rights occurred because the exemption analysis
employed in Boulder was developed to resolve federal-federal conflicts, and
therefore, it did not trigger the analysis necessary to resolve properly federal-
state conflicts. Further, the decision contradicts the Court's prior stance in
Usery that Congress may not act in a manner which functionally abrogates
the state's ability to structure its internal operations.
As a result of Boulder, a home rule municipality may be denied immunity
from antitrust laws that non-home rule cities potentially may enjoy. This
inequitable result, and its accompanying burden on states which have
160. For example, municipalities may request two-way services or interconnection with other
regional systems. Linking the cable systems of nearby communities may provide more funding
and support for new services due to the larger viewing audiences.
161. The role of the states in cable regulation is to oversee and coordinate local regulation.
Densely populated states like New Jersey, for example, might require a greater number of public
access channels and a greater commitment to neighborhood service. Wyoming, on the other
hand, might decide that individual community systems are unnecessary and opt for uniform
state-wide service. Each state must assess its differing needs and specify franchising procedures,
create franchise areas, and establish minimum standards for cable systems accordingly. See
SLOAN REPORT, supra note 148, at 152.
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delegated broad plenary powers to their local subdivisions, is likely to result
in an unwarranted restriction of a state's ability to structure its own govern-
ment. The "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" standard required
by Boulder hampers local government in regulating cable television. Unfor-
tunately, this industry possesses characteristics which suggest that local regula-
tion is most appropriate. Paradoxically, the Court's decision hampers state
and local governments' ability to deal with local problems at a time when
the current administration is imposing additional burdens and responsibilities
on state and local governments to provide basic public services and to pro-
tect the public's health, safety and welfare.
Mary S. Consalvi

